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This paper analyses how Ugandan army commanders have mobilised transborder
economic networks to exploit economic opportunities in eastern DRC during the
military intervention of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) in Congo’s
wars (199697; 19982003). These transborder networks are the starting point of
our evaluation of the informal political structures and networks linking Uganda’s
political centre to Congo’s war complex. While it is often claimed that military
entrepreneurismalism in the DRC has undermined political stability in Uganda,
we argue that the activities of Ugandan military entrepreneurs and networks
under their control were an integral part of Uganda’s governance regime. Crucial
to the development of this entrepreneurialism was the existence of pre-war
transborder networks of economic exchange that were connecting Congo to
eastern African markets. Military control over these highly informalised networks
facilitated UPDF commanders’ access to Congo’s resources. Rather than
operating as privatised sources of accumulation, these military shadow networks
were directly linked to the inner circles of the Ugandan regime.
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In December 2008, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF) entered the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and launched an attack on the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA), which was hiding in Garamba National Park in northern
DRC, just across the border from Sudan. This military strike, called Operation
Lightning Thunder, aimed at dislodging and ending the military activity of the armed
group. Two years later, however, the LRA remains at large and is held responsible for
killing and abducting hundreds of Congolese civilians. UPDF forces still in the area
have not been able to stop the LRA from terrorising the local population and have
become part of a highly complex local security context.
Operation Lighting Thunder was not the first UPDF military operation on
Congolese territory.1 In 1996, Uganda was part of a regional coalition that was
officially born out of growing security threats from Rwandan Hutu rebels and
Ugandan rebel groups that were operating from their Congolese bases and that were
receiving assistance from the Mobutu regime. In the north-eastern parts of the DRC,
UPDF troops offered considerable support to the Kabila’s rebel movement that
eventually removed Mobutu from power. In support of the Rwanda led military
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operation against the Kabila regime, two years later, UPDF troops again entered the
DRC. This time, things did not go as smoothly as two years before. A growing
number of sources started reporting on the involvement of high-ranking UPDF
officials or ‘‘entrepreneurs of insecurity’’2 in what could be called acts of ‘‘military
entrepreneurialism’’.3 Hardly three years after the beginning of the second Congolese
war (19982003), senior UPDF officers, linked to Congolese militias and interna-
tional commercial networks, were singled out by a UN Panel of Experts report on
the illegal exploitation of resources. The head of the Ugandan expeditionary corps in
the DRC, General James Kazini, the Chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Noble
Mayombo, Uganda’s presidential adviser on Congo, Col. Kahinda Otafiire,
President Museveni’s brother and UPDF, Lieutenant General (Ret) Salim Saleh
his wife Jovia Akwandwanaho, and Colonel Peter Kerim were all named as key
players of what was referred to by the same UN Panel of Experts report as an ‘‘elite
network’’4 plundering Congo’s natural resources.
In most explanations of Uganda’s military involvement in the Congolese conflict,
these networks have taken central stage but yet have hardly been defined. Prunier5
mentions phenomena of ‘‘corruption’’, Clark talks about ‘‘mercenary activities’’,6
Raeymaekers about ‘‘privatised networks of individual army officials, local warlords
and international enterprises’’.7 Many scholars have explained these actors or
structures as being part of non-state forms of organisation, and usually focus on their
‘‘privatised’’, ‘‘informal’’, ‘‘illicit’’ or ‘‘criminal’’ behaviour. Networks are considered
as predatory forces and socially destructive forms of organisation, undermining
political stability, the functioning of state institutions, and economic efficiency.8
Other authors though have argued that these personalised networks can shape
political processes and political authority,9 particularly in Africa’s war-torn societies
or fragile states. This article wants to document and contextualise the role played by
UPDF forces in the informal political structures and networks linking Uganda’s
political centre to Congo’s war complex.
This analysis is based on three main arguments. First, an historical perspective
reveals that this informal transborder (military) entrepreneurialism is not a new
phenomenon. Even if in this case it is directly linked to a recent external military
deployment, it relies on pre-existing and pre-war exchange networks between Congo
and Uganda. It is not exclusively linked to the war context or to the deployment of
foreign troops even if this conflict setting has temporarily maximised profits and has
added fluidity in the transformation of the network leaderships. Second, these
networks are often too hastily qualified as privatised networks. In the Ugandan case,
these networks were embedded in the first circles of the political and military power
of the Ugandan regime and were intricately linked to the state structure and
administration. These ‘‘structures of opportunity’’ included formal and informal
elements and could best be described as militarised shadow networks developing a
clear interconnectedness between public and private logics, as well as between state
and non-state actors. Third, reflection needs to be made on the perpetuation of these
networks within the Ugandan state, since the end of the Congolese war. It needs to
be evaluated if these shadow networks have undermined or rather strengthened
Uganda’s state system. The main question here is whether these networks of
accumulation could be considered as autonomously operating or in the end being
integrated in the political system, and if and how these networks have transformed
the nature of Uganda’s state and ruling regime.
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In this paper, we will focus first on the pre-war economic environment and its
linkage between local, regional and global networks. We will then offer an
ethnography of actors involved through the trajectory of some UPDF commanders,
their interactions and strategies to penetrate and benefit from the exploitation of
these networks. We will then evaluate the extent to which Uganda’s military
intervention in eastern DRC in return has shaped and reshaped existing patterns
of transborder economic exchange and internal political processes in Uganda.
Finally, the capacity of these networks to perpetuate themselves in non-war
situations will be analysed. It will be shown that most network members have
been recycled into the state-apparatus after the Congo war. As will be illustrated,
there are even indications that they have started playing a prominent role in
Uganda’s oil business, which is still in the early stages of its development.
The role of pre-war economic networks
A historical perspective on transborder trade in UgandaCongo’s borderland reveals
the embeddedness of UPDF’s military entrepreneurialism during DRC’s wars
in localised and transborder networks. These pre-war networks facilitated the
development of a ‘‘military-commercial nexus’’10 in UgandaCongo’s borderland
during the UPDF’s involvement in the Congolese wars. Already during the 1980s,
porous borders11 and weak local state institutions12 facilitated the development of
transborder informal networks of economic exchange in this area. While destroying
the formal economy of Zaire, these networks used state power to instrumentalise
the potentialities of informal trade through a subversion of the state regulatory
authority.13 From the early 1980s on, cross-border economic transactions drastically
increased, both in volume and in their illicit character, and consolidated the
emergence of a vast regional network of informal trade that became ‘‘the means
by which seemingly disastrous national economies managed to keep going’’.14
But even prior to this expansion of informal trade, illicit transborder activities
were already flourishing in the region. In 1963, an agent of the Congolese tax
administration reported the illicit exportation of agricultural commodities by
caravans of porters on the North KivuUganda border. And in 1964, the illegal
exportation of diamonds from the Congo was estimated to represent 81% of the
official production.15
The expansion of these informal activities is mainly related to the liberalisation of
the production, exploitation and commercialisation of a number of key minerals in
1982. Where official international treaties in the Great Lakes Region failed to create
regional economic integration, unrecorded cross-border trade resulted in unofficial
market integration beyond the state limits. As MacGaffey concludes, ‘‘it was partly
owing to the ingenuity of local entrepreneurs that (. . .) Zaire was able to ward off
harsh blows of a decade-long flight of foreign capital and cuts in economic
assistance’’.16 Not only local entrepreneurs profited from these smuggling activities:
‘‘private businesses, transportation companies, and tax-collecting bureaucracies
throughout the region benefited significantly from the informal sector and the
income opportunities it provided’’.17 In resource rich provinces, hundreds of private
small-scale exploitation structures were created and absorbed by local and foreign
networks. Also in Orientale province, gold production and commercialisation
increasingly fell under control of informal traders (mainly of Nande and Hema
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origins) and became the backbone of a transborder trade that was connecting
Ugandan and Congolese markets.
Even though violence was already part of the management of these pre-existing
networks, during the Congolese wars, these networks’ modes of exploitation and
commercialisation became entirely militarised. After their arrival in 1996, UPDF
commanders discovered a veritable ‘‘Mini Eldorado’’ in the eastern parts of Zaire.18
In Kisangani and Ituri, both flourishing centres of informal diamond and gold trade,
UPDF officers started exploiting Congolese minerals for their own benefit. Initially,
smuggling activities of the UPDF were mainly organised on an individual basis.
UPDF commanders quickly learned though how to turn their military control into a
profitable enterprise by developing a lucrative ‘‘modus vivendi’’ with Congolese
business communities in Orientale Province. Local Congolese traders, even if they
did not benefit directly from the war, could continue their economic activity or could
even profit from it if they were able to reach a position in the military trade
mechanisms. But also Ugandan traders took advantage of UPDF’s presence in the
DRC and were offered free passage to sell goods such as soap, metal roof sheeting,
fuel, canned food and clothing to the Congolese consumer market in exchange for
natural resources and agricultural produce. The fact that UPDF’s military
intervention in 1997 was a lucrative enterprise also for the Ugandan economy was
illustrated by the country’s gold exports, which in 1997 skyrocketed to the second
largest source of export income.19
The dynamics of military entrepreneurialism20
There exists some disagreement between different authors on the initial motivation
of Uganda’s intervention in the DRC, yet it can hardly be doubted that security
objectives soon were also diverted or manipulated for financial and economic stakes.
The economic benefits of these military entrepreneurs brought into light the lucrative
dynamic of the Congolese conflict. It could be argued that these individuals, assured
of their political position at home, continuously exploited a context of insecurity in
the DRC as a source of private income. For several observers, these strategies point
at an informalisation of politics and the military in Uganda.21 Eriksen even states
that ‘‘because the regime is politically dependent on support from the army, it
has been unable or unwilling to control the behaviour of its armed forces in Congo
and to prevent private profiteering’’.22 Realities on the ground suggest a more
sophisticated reading. The UPDF developed a strategy of politico-economic and
military control in the DRC that went beyond private gain. The generated resources
were used, paradoxically, for the strengthening of the domestic political regime,23
even if it can be argued that the private agendas of individual UPDF commanders at
some point inflicted with this very objective.
The rise of these military entrepreneurs of insecurity evolved as the fluctuating
relationships with the central Congolese government dictated. First and foremost,
during the first war Uganda and Rwanda concluded an alliance with Kabila
to get access to local networks of economic control, particularly in the mining sector.
After Kabila took power in May 1997, economic relations between both countries
intensified, with several visits of Ugandan delegations of businessmen and gov-
ernment officials to the DRC and a formalisation of cooperation through a number
of bilateral agreements, including a railway that would connect Ugandan and
Congolese markets but was never realised. Both countries also concluded an
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agreement on military cooperation. In April 1998, an arrangement that allowed the
UPDF to conduct operations in eastern DRC against several Ugandan militias was
formalised with a Protocol on Security along the Common Border.24
In spring 1998, the UgandanCongolese relationship started to deteriorate
though. Prior to the start of the second Congolese war, the Congolese Minister
of Economy and Oil, Pierre Victor Mpoyo, caused a heavy blast in the relations
between Congo and Uganda when accusing Ugandan government officials of
warlord practices and their involvement in the smuggling of gold, diamond and
timber from north-eastern DRC.25 Inspired by the fears of a Rwanda led coup d’e´tat
and in search for a local power base, on July 27, 1998, the Kabila regime urged all
foreign troops to leave the country within two weeks. This decision was the final
trigger to a second RwandanUgandan military adventure in the DRC. Six days
after Rwandan and Ugandan troops were expelled, the same troops re-entered the
country.
During this second Ugandan intervention (19982003), the exploitation of
Congolese resources became much more systematic, and trading networks, link-
ing mining centres in Congo’s hinterland to international traders, drastically
expanded. The patterns of military commercialism evolved from a parasitic structure
of military business and petty thieves, already active during the first war but also in
northern Uganda for example, to a paroxysmal entrepreneurial logic of conflict
economy linked with international legal as well as illegal and criminal networks.26
At their (re)arrival in the DRC, the Ugandan expeditionary corps tried to take
control over trade and business in the territories they controlled. A main target was
the exploitation of natural and strategic resources (gold, coltan, diamonds, and
cassiterite) but also timber, coffee, ivory, and vanilla. To consolidate control and
guarantee continuous production, several alternative structures were put in place. In
the Kilo Moto area (Ituri District), the old mining guards of the Zairian state
company were replaced by UPDF controlled elements, while individual recruits
started monitoring access to the mining sites by guarding bridges and strategic
roadblocks and by levying taxes from local miners and traders. In addition to the
export of natural resources, the Ugandan military controlled imports and distribu-
tion of goods from Entebbe (beer, cigarettes, sodas, toilet papers, etc.) around
Gbadolite (northern DRC) and Bunia (Ituri).
This economic production was largely generated through individuals closely
linked to the Ugandan regime (including a number of ‘‘Historicals’’, i.e. political-
military figures associated to Museveni’s National Resistance Army from the first
years in the bush at the beginning of the 1980s and then at the core of the decision
making-process in the Ugandan military and State), as well as members of the First
family, sometimes via straw societies or dummy companies. The case of Lieutenant-
Colonel Jet Mwebaze serves well to illustrate this. In September 1998, Mwebaze died
in a plane crash in the Rwenzori Mountains, along Uganda’s western border with the
DRC. It turned out that the plane carried a million dollars in cash, which was going
to be used for the acquisition of a considerable amount of gold in the Ituri district.
In all likelihood, Mwebaze and his business partners  a group of gold traders
employed by Major-General Salim Saleh’s Efforte Corporation  were hoping to
take advantage of the fact that their load of gold would be classified as military cargo
and would therefore not be subject to the payment of customs duties.27
The existence of this type of networks (which involved Congolese, Rwandese
and Ugandan political leaders, military commanders, businessmen, leaders of armed
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groups, local administrators and international commercialisation networks) would
be presented as an illustration of warfare aimed at maximising profit through
military control over resources and based on a partnership between military
commanders and businessmen. Through the control of the pre-war chain of
transactions and intermediaries between mining centres and urban trading posts,
or through direct exploitation of mining centres, top-ranking officers from Rwanda
and Uganda could lay their hands on most of the local mining production. Price-
fixing, forced monopoly, and the direct or indirect control over customs helped to
consolidate a total control of the exploitation of resources. Different financial
networks had to back this system and to guarantee the financing of the war efforts,
while new networks of transportation, increasingly based on air transport, eased the
exchange of goods with the Congolese interior.
This phenomenon questions the links between violence, politics and economy. If
in the first Congolese conflict the war economy remained an epiphenomenon and
helped the Ugandan regime to finance the war, in the second one, the economic
component of the conflict became a major dynamic of the conflict. The war was no
longer a military conquest but a position war in which mining sites, forests as well as
roads and airports became the main military objectives. The military, rebel armed
groups and militias ensured the perpetuation of these networks by maintaining
insecurity and promoting the emergence of militarised local big men.
A number of key figures of the Ugandan regime played a crucial role in this
economic exploitation. Particularly the careers of James Kazini and Salim Saleh are
symbolic for the rise of a new class of ‘‘entrepreneurs of insecurity’’. General James
Kazini was a key actor not only in DRC’s war economy but also in the manipulation
of local conflict dynamics. At the end of August 1998, he was pointed out as
the principal holder of timber looted from the stockpiles of Amex-bois and La
Forestiere. In January 1999, Kazini, who was by then closely associated with
Congolese rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, confiscated hundreds of tons of coffee
stocks from Bumba, Lisala, Bosonzo, Binga and Mindembo.28 This traffic required
large redistribution and network offshoots, including international commercialisa-
tion channels, ‘‘comptoirs d’achat’’ and intermediaries. In Equateur and Province
Orientale, James Kazini constituted the link between UPDF officers and the
Congolese leaders of armed groups. As UPDF Overall Commander in the DRC
from 1998 to 2000, he became a close collaborator of Congolese rebel leaders 
Mbusa Nyamwisi, John Tibasiima, Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie-
Mouvement de Libe´ration (RCD-ML), Roger Lumbala, Rassemblement Congolais
pour la De´mocratie-National (RCD-National) and Jean-Pierre Bemba, Mouvement
pour la Libe´ration du Congo (MLC)  all of whom facilitated his illegal dealings in
diamonds, coltan, timber, counterfeit currency, gold and coffee.
Another crucial personality and one of the most famous representatives of these
military entrepreneurs was Salim Saleh, President Museveni’s brother. Endlessly
diversifying his activities, he developed a resource accumulation strategy that skilfully
mixed civilian and military business, charity and ‘‘legitimate corruption’’, as well as
national development and international capitalism.29 In 19992000, Salim Saleh
opened a trading post for the commercialisation of gold and diamonds in Kisangani
and controlled a number of aviation companies that operated commercial flights
from Uganda to the DRC. At least two Ugandan airlines claimed a quasi-monopoly
on the flights to Equateur and Oriental province: Air Alexander belonging to
Salim Saleh’s wife (Jovia Akandwanaho), and Uganda Air Cargo that operated
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in Gemena, Basankasu, Isiro and Buta. A third company that is often mentioned
is Air Navette, which was hired regularly by Salim Saleh and the leader of MLC
(Jean-Pierre Bemba), and operated in Gbadolite, Gemena, Kisangani and Bunia. The
Saleh couple, together with Kazini, was also linked to Trinity Investment, a company
officially managed by the leader of the RCD-ML, specialised in the exploitation of
timber in Ituri and North Kivu and that transported among others agricultural
products, wood and cattle on behalf of the Gegere families from Bunia to Kampala
exempt of UPDF toll barriers and export taxes. Another society, Sagricof, was
discretely controlled by Col. Peter Kerim, who was in charge of combat operations in
the Rwenzori mountains, and K. Otafiire, and was associated to Trinity Investment.
But these military entrepreneurs also relied on contacts with international
business associates. An interesting example is the structure of control around La
Conmet and the Ituri Gold Mining Company, two companies run by the Russian
business couple Valentina Piskunova and Anatoly Piskunov. During the second
Congo war, La Conmet was based in Butembo, sourcing coltan from rebel-held areas
and selling the minerals to clients in South Africa, Kazakhstan and Germany.
There are strong indications that the company enjoyed the protection of Salim Saleh
and Mbusa Nyamwisi, the then leader of the RCD-ML rebel movement,30 but
Museveni’s brother has always denied these allegations.31 As for the Ituri Gold
Mining Company, this entity is known to have organised an exploratory trip in
the Ituri district in the beginning of 1999, in order to investigate the options for
setting up gold transactions between Congo and Uganda. The mission received
the approval of the leadership of the RCD-ML and attracted businessmen from
various backgrounds, including Daniel Tiomkin, a Ukrainian entrepreneur living in
South Africa, and Abdul Karangwa, a Rwandan businessman previously belonging
to the inner circle of Laurent-De´sire´ Kabila.32
The reconfiguration of domestic political power
As stated above, key to the success of these militarised economic activities was the
existence of pre-war transborder networks of economic and social exchange that
could be mobilised and exploited by new coalitions of army commanders, rebel
leaders, traders and local authorities. The manipulation of the CongoleseUgandan
borderland during the Congolese wars offers an interesting example of how
unregulated economic activities can be moments of reconfiguration of local
regulation and reconstitution of public authority and state power. While political
scientists and historians have paid a lot of attention to how states have tried to deal
with their borderlands, far less attention has been given to how these borderlands
deal with states33 and how they reshape state authority. Nevertheless, as is illustrated
by recent developments in the UgandanCongolese borderland, these zones can also
be understood as regions of inventiveness, creating their own institutional arrange-
ments and regulatory regimes that eventually (re)define their relationship with the
central state.34
Uganda’s military presence in the DRC was largely based and depended on close
collaboration between UPDF commanders and Congolese rebel leaders, traders and
political elites. In order to consolidate its military position, the Ugandan regime
concluded security arrangements with local elites that went much further than
territorial and border control but also comprised private business deals. The UPDF
made business in developing a dual economy of protection and extortion. One
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strategy was the enforced payment of tributes or protection fees by private traders
doing business in the zones the UPDF militarily controlled. Rather than investing
directly in mining activities, they co-opted experienced, and well-connected pre-
existing diamond dealers. The occupying armies granted contracts or concessions
to private businesses, and issued permits and safe conduits to facilitate private
business in return for the payment of protection taxes to the UPDF or to allied rebel
leaders. In the end, new arrangements restructured or replaced pre-war networks,
reinforced the link between local businessmen and international commercial partners
and instigated a new process of regional economic integration, with businessmen,
traders, local bureaucracies, tax administrations and military leaderships as its main
actors.
The outcomes of these arrangements caused additional contestation on a local
level though, while the UPDF never had the capacity to fully control local power
struggles. This forced its commanders to continuously adapt to changing contexts
and identify alternative partners and alternative strategies to protect their business
interests. The UPDF involvement in the Ituri conflict illustrates very well the
opportunities, challenges and limits of military entrepreneurialism. Between 1999
and 2003, this district, which shares borders with Uganda and Sudan, witnessed
one of the most severe episodes of the Congolese war as a result of the exploitation,
by local and regional actors, of a deeply rooted local conflict over access to land,
economic opportunity and political power. Local antagonism, which in origin
centred on control over vital livelihoods including land, was skilfully manipulated by
UPDF commanders for the development of alternative transborder networks. One of
the key players was Gen. James Kazini, who understood the benefits of an alliance
with the local Hema community. In 1999, a number of Hema landowners threatened
to evict Lendu farmers from their land, based on fraudulently acquired property
titles. Revenge acts by local Lendu leaders led to a first series of violent clashes.
Hema landowners started recruiting defence groups that soon acquired the support
of some UPDF units, who started acting as private security guards for Hema elites.
This security arrangement became the backbone of an emerging Hema politico-
economic power base. Hema traders started operating under the protection of the
UPDF and succeeded in expanding their commercial enterprise, which ultimately
connected local markets to Ugandan and international traders. This economic
partnership was further consolidated on the politico-administrative level with the
appointment by Gen. Kazini of Ade`le Lotsove Mugisa, a Hema, as the governor of
the newly created province Kabale-Ituri. Kazini’s decision met with fierce resistance
from the governor of Orientale province, who technically still had control over Ituri.
The creation of a separate province was a personal decision taken by Kazini as part
of a larger strategy to install an alternative power structure under his protection,
which was relying on Hema networks. But for non-Hema communities, this was a
clear move to exclude them from the local decision-making process and transborder
trading networks.
Another illustration of how the Ugandan intervention in the DRC not only
created economic opportunities to members of the Ugandan politico-military elite
but also allowed actors operating in the UgandanCongolese borderland to
reposition themselves in local and regional markets is the case of Aru-Mahagi.
Based in Ituri’s border region with Uganda, this area during part of the war was
under control of the ‘‘Forces Arme´es du Peuple Congolais’’ (FAPC), which was led
by Je´roˆme Kakwavu. Je´roˆme, who received support from the Ugandan regime, had a
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particular interest in controlling border towns such as Aru and Ariwara, as
historically these were the centres of an informal transborder trade that was
connecting West Nile to north-eastern DRC.35 As transit points for gold and timber,
these towns had a considerable economic value. In collaboration with a number of
key businessmen on both sides of the border, Je´roˆme’s rebel organisation put in place
a sophisticated system that protected the interests of ‘‘a closely knit network,
including selected officers of FAPC, members of Fe´de´ration des Entreprises du
Congo, Ugandan businessmen, Ugandan officials and internationally linked
commercial entities’’.36 The border was essential: a customs revenue apparatus was
installed that had to replace the pre-war state bureaucracy and to guarantee the
payment of taxes by all traders importing goods to the DRC or exporting resources
to Uganda. Since the import and export taxes imposed by the FAPC were
significantly lower than the official government taxes and the taxes in other areas
in eastern DRC, the Aru/Ariwara areas developed into what Titeca has described as
an ‘‘African Monaco’’, that is, a tax paradise attracting traders from places far away
from the border.37 Moreover, close Congolese and Ugandan business associates
could profit from a preferential pre-financing system, which in return for the
payment of an agreed amount of money exempted them from paying custom duties.
The arrangement between the rebels and traders, which was developed in
collaboration with the local branch of the Fe´de´ration des Entreprises du Congo
(FEC), included that goods could be imported or exported without the payment of
taxes during a specific period of time.
The developing politico-economic enterprises in the UgandanCongolese border-
land soon proved to have their limits though. Firstly, economic stakes generated
substantial competition, both within the UPDF and between Ugandan and Rwandan
army commanders. It is generally believed that Kazini and Joviah Akwandwanaho’s
decision to take over the informal diamond trade in eastern Congo marked the
beginning of the so-called ‘‘Kisangani wars’’ between the Ugandan and Rwandan
armies that would cause a serious blow to UgandanRwandan relations. As part of
an attempt to expand its sphere of control in northern and north-eastern DRC, the
Ugandan regime preferred to mobilise a number of proxies, including Bemba’s MLC
but also parts of the RCD. This rebel movement eventually split into a number of
factions, leading to a military fragmentation and the carving up of the rebel-held
territories in different zones of control. But also between UPDF units, tensions rose
mainly because of Kazini’s strategic choices. At a certain point, these standing
differences even resulted in an open confrontation between two opposing UPDF
units in Ituri.38
Secondly, the UPDF was never in control of local realities, partly because of the
complexity of local conflicts but also because of a lack of political leadership over the
expeditionary corps, which eventually led to an open rift within the UPDF itself. Not
long after the creation of the province of Kabale-Ituri, Thomas Lubanga  the
nephew of administrator Lotsove  established the UPC (‘‘Union des Patriotes
Congolais’’), which successfully took control over Bunia in August 2002. From there,
it instituted its own governance apparatus and structures of control, which forced
other ethnic groups to establish their own armed groups. Initially supported by
General Kazini in pursuing its exclusivist agenda, the UPC’s shift to Rwanda urged
other UPDF officers to develop a different military strategy towards the Ituri
conflict. Several UPDF commanders offered support to other, non-Hema militias
that regularly clashed in resource-rich areas (particularly for the control over gold
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mines around Mongbwalu) and further complicated the local politico-military
landscape. After Ugandan troops in May 2003 eventually withdrew from the DRC,
members of the Ugandan regime tried to keep a foot in the door through the creation
of additional local proxy forces without being able to control them.39
Thirdly, while the interconnection between military occupation and economic
enterprise in eastern DRC was facilitated by the existence of pre-war transborder
trading networks, at the same time it has strongly transformed economic regulation
at the UgandanCongolese borderland. The Congolese war only further reinforced
existing dynamics. It also economically integrated Ituri into regional markets, with
an important stake (some argue quasi-monopoly) of Ugandan traders in local
Congolese markets. The vast production of commodities such as gold and timber
today is fraudulently exported to Uganda, often in compliance with official state
representatives on both sides of the border. As elsewhere in Congo’s borderlands,
these trading activities are subject to constant negotiation between traders, custom
agents, security officials and provincial departments.
‘‘Privatised’’ networks and the Ugandan state: what happened after the war?
The question remains what the interconnection between military intervention and
economic enterprise meant in terms of regime stability and what it tells us about the
nature of the Ugandan state. Several arguments have been put forward. One line of
reasoning is that the existence of these shadow networks weakened ‘‘the state control
over private patronage’’40 and expressed a redefinition of the nature and form of the
Ugandan state, and of its mode of governance and domination. For some observers,
the political centre lost control over the UPDF units operating in the DRC. These
networks would have gained a high degree of autonomy. Clark suggests that
Museveni may have had to retard the withdrawal of troops because of these
networks: ‘‘it may even be the case that President Museveni ‘negotiated with’ his own
army in some instances, rather than commanded it, as some evidence suggests’’.41
The personalisation of the Ugandan military as a result of the growing power of
different officers through their control over informal networks ‘‘in the field’’ may
indeed indicate that these Ugandan politico-military entrepreneurs drifted away from
the central government. Another theory, however, starts from a regime security
argument and suggests that the UPDF intervention in the DRC would have been
planned or used to strengthen and enlarge Museveni’s support networks on the
domestic scene. The mere existence of these networks would have been approved by
Museveni himself, with the benefit not necessarily been directed towards the state but
to Museveni’s supporters and his regime. Rather than a threat of destabilisation, this
plunder economy inside of the military should thus be considered as ‘‘functional’’ for
the political centre.
From these two perspectives, it can be concluded that the relationship between
the state and these privatised networks is far from being as clear as it may seem.
At the end of the 1990s, there were fears that once these informal networks would go
back home, they would threaten Museveni’s regime through their autonomisation
from the central high military command and that they could potentially ally with the
Uganda’s political opposition. The increasing autonomy of these informal networks
through predation and criminalisation in the DRC indeed induces questions about
the future of these networks and their effect on regime stability. Were the UPDF
in the DRC becoming a ‘‘corps social guerrier’’, built by war and socially reproduced
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in war42 and thus a potential source of domestic destabilisation? Or should it be
doubted that these entrepreneurs of insecurity really could ‘‘act financially and
politically in the international system without interference from the state in which
(they are) based?’’43 For Reno, the violence perpetuated by the UPDF in northern
Uganda after the transfer of the troops initially based in the DRC as well as the
official decrease in gold exports, induce an increased capacity of informal networks
to by-pass the state official economy and show the relative loss of control of the
phenomenon by central government.44 It should be recognised though that these
networks did not act without interference from the political centre and (in the longer
run) did not fragilise the Ugandan regime (even though it created dissensions within
the Ugandan military, among the Historicals themselves but mainly between the
Historicals and junior officers). It does illustrate a strong interconnectedness of
parallel networks with formal state structures, with the formal centre of power
helping to consolidate the power and resources of shadow structures and the same
shadow networks being exploited by the political centre.
Rather than becoming a threat to Uganda’s political stability, most of the
entrepreneurs of insecurity after their return to Uganda have been recycled or
reintegrated into the state machinery. Apart from a few arrests and layoffs, the main
leaders of the shadow networks who were involved in Congo’s resource trade are still
in charge of public affairs. Salim Saleh was first recycled as Minister of State for
Micro-Finance and later became senior presidential adviser. Kahinda Otafiire was
appointed Minister for Local Government, which gave him opportunities to help
other veterans from the DRC to acquire plots of land (for example the land bought
by Salim Saleh’s firm Yaya to build a hotel in Kampala).45 He then became the
minister of Trade and Industry and is currently (January 2012) the minister for
Justice and Constitutional Affairs. Col. John Mugyenyi, former commander of a
UPDF brigade in eastern Congo, maintained his business activities in Kampala and
bought a large part of the Kisekka market via his firm Rhino Investments. As a close
ally of Museveni and more especially of Salim Saleh, he contributed to the funding of
Museveni’s presidential campaign in 2006.
The same goes for a number of prominent Uganda-based businessmen like Sam
Engola who closely collaborated with the UPDF during the two Congo wars. As the
owner of Showa Trade, a Uganda-registered cargo company transporting military
supplies between Entebbe and eastern DRC by order of the Ugandan military
authorities, Engola maintained close relationships with key figures in the UPDF
during the second Congo war.46 This enabled him to develop business activities in
rebel-held areas, which he supplied with commodities such as salt, soap, cigarettes,
fuel and beer, often without paying taxes to the local authorities.47 Although a UN
Panel of Experts accused Engola of having drawn financial benefit from his country’s
military involvement in the Congo war, the Porter Commission of Inquiry in
Kampala concluded that he had not been involved in any illegal activities in the
DRC.48 With his name cleared by the Ugandan judicial authorities, Engola was able
to continue his business activities like before. Moreover, as a candidate for
Museveni’s NRM in the 2011 elections, he managed to win a parliamentary seat
for the Erute County South. On 27 May 2011, a little more than three months after
the elections, he was appointed Minister for Housing.49
James Kazini was a clear exception though. Despite strategic mistakes committed
by Kazini in Kisangani, he was promoted50 and deployed to Southern Sudan for
Operation Iron Fist on return from eastern Congo. Already accused of perjury by the
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UN Panel of Experts, he was dismissed after the publication of the report of the
Porter Commission51 that accused him of disobedience to President Museveni’s
order not to help Congolese businesses. Maj. Gen. James Kazini had been on
‘‘katebe’’ (undeployed) since 2003 and was fired as army commander in June 2003; in
March 2008 he was finally convicted and sentenced to jail.52 A three-man committee
(Gen. Tinyefuza, Hon. Mbabazi and Gen. Salim Saleh) investigated him from
June to September 2003 over the existence of ghost soldiers on the UPDF payroll,
financial loss and embezzlement and the creation of a semi-autonomous military
unit (the 409 brigade) in West Nile. He was suspected of plotting a coup
against Museveni, together with the former Alpine Brigade Commander Lt. Col.
Muhindo.53 This three-men commission of inquiry convicted him in March 2008
and sentenced him to a three-year jail term for causing financial loss over creating
ghost soldiers in the army pay-roll.54 This affair seems to prove that Museveni never
fully lost control over these entrepreneurs of insecurity. Even more, the arrest of
James Kazini was believed to be linked to his political ambitions and not to his
role in the shadow economic structure in the DRC.
The end of the Congolese war did not preclude the perpetuation of these
militarised actors in their involvement in and control over transborder informal
trading networks. A November 2009 report to the United Nations Security Council
disclosed again the existence in Uganda of private networks involved in the smuggling
of gold and other commodities from the DRC.55 The recorded and unrecorded
mineral trade from Ituri and North Kivu is still passing partly through Uganda where
there is no tax issued on exports. And even though UPDF commanders pulled out
from the extracting sector to the profit of Congolese gold traders, the Ugandan
military is definitely still involved in the commercialisation of gold once arriving in
Entebbe.56 Finally, recent developments in Uganda’s oil sector have fuelled
speculations about the survival of the aforementioned militarised shadow networks
in this emerging profitable sector.
Secrecy, intrigue and turmoil in Uganda’s oil sector
Since 2006, prominent members of Uganda’s political and military elite have been
keeping close control over evolutions in the country’s nascent oil industry. This has
manifested itself in the fact that the negotiations on the contracts with international
oil companies have been taking place in an atmosphere of utmost secrecy, while the
responsibility for guarding Uganda’s oil assets has been given to a special unit within
the UPDF and a private security company led by close family members of Museveni.
The secretiveness surrounding the oil deals has sparked off rumours that the
President is using Uganda’s oil wealth to grease the wheels of patronage and to
secure the survival of old shadow networks. Whether these rumours are true or not
remains to be seen, but they definitely have a significant impact on Ugandan politics
and regime stability. Political opponents of Museveni are using the oil imbroglio as
an opportunity to question the legitimacy and credibility of the government, to
demand a stronger and more effective anti-corruption policy, and to insist on the
need for better democratic oversight of the use of Uganda’s natural resources.57
Oil exploration and exploitation are not entirely new in Uganda. The first
recording of oil occurrence in the Lake Albert Rift basin, situated on the border
between Uganda and the DRC, dates back to the early 1920s. Yet, after the drilling
of the first deep oil well by Shell Oil in 1938, the development of Uganda’s oil
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industry came to a standstill due to the eruption of the Second World War, the
political instability of the 1950s and 1960s, and the bad investment climate during the
rule of Idi Amin. It was not until Museveni’s assumption of power in 1986 that the
Ugandan government became genuinely interested in capitalising on the country’s oil
wealth. A group of approximately 100 students was sent overseas to follow training
in geology, and considerable efforts were made to gather data on Uganda’s oil
reserves. Thanks to aerial surveys conducted in the 1980s and magnetic surveys
carried out in the 1990s, the Ugandan authorities were able to divide the Ugandan
side of Albert Graben58 into different exploration zones. In 200304, oil exploration
gained momentum and, today, several international oil companies are competing for
the best pieces of the pie.59 It is estimated that, by mid-2009, companies had spent
more than $700 million on oil exploration in the region.60
Tensions associated with the competition for Uganda’s oil reserves came to the
surface in August and September 2007, when a number of violent clashes took place
between units of the Ugandan and Congolese armies along the international border
that runs through the middle of Lake Albert. On 3 August 2007, there was a heavy
exchange of fire between, on the one hand, three patrol boats filled with Congolese
soldiers and, on the other hand, one boat filled with UPDF guards and employees of
the private security company Saracen, who were guarding an oil exploration barge
belonging to the company Heritage Oil Plc. The incident left at least two people
dead: one Congolese soldier and one British national working for Heritage.61 On 24
September 2007, another military clash occurred, which involved  once again  an
oil vessel belonging to Heritage Oil Plc and two groups of patrol boats respectively
manned by Congolese and Ugandan soldiers. The direct cause of the latter incident
was the interception of Heritage’s oil boat by MONUC, the UN peacekeeping
mission in Congo. Claiming that the Heritage boat had illegally crossed into
Congolese waters (an allegation denied by Heritage), MONUC escorted it to the
Kasenyi landing site, arrested its four crew members and interrogated them for
several hours before releasing them again. In the meantime, UPDF had sent out a
rescue mission, which engaged in a gunfight with Congolese soldiers in the middle of
Lake Albert, a clash that left several people injured and one Congolese soldier
dead.62
These incidents illustrate how the newly discovered oil wealth around Lake
Albert gave rise to a fierce border dispute between Congo and Uganda. In addition
to this, they also point at the role of the UPDF in the protection of Uganda’s oil
assets, which, according to the Ugandan government, are of vital importance for the
country’s development. Museveni even decided to charge the Presidential Guard
Brigade (PGB), a special unit in the UPDF, with the task of securing the oil areas.63
This is remarkable, because the PGB is led by Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Museveni’s
first-born son whom the UN believes to have taken part in the illicit trade of
Congolese natural resources during the war.64 Equally striking is the fact that
Saracen, the private security company responsible for guarding the installations and
personnel of Heritage Oil Plc at the time of the incidents on Lake Albert, is
associated with Museveni’s half-brother Salim Saleh, another prominent member of
the militarised shadow networks operational during the war.65 In 2002, a UN Panel
of Experts accused Saleh and his company Saracen of supporting a paramilitary
group in north-eastern DRC.66 Moreover, Saracen Uganda is known to be
an offshoot of Saracen International, a company registered in South Africa and
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formed with the remnants of the infamous private mercenary firm Executive
Outcomes.
Uganda’s political opposition has sharply criticised the involvement of members
of Museveni’s inner circle in the oil sector.67 Another point of criticism concerns the
opacity of the Ugandan oil sector in general. Not only is a special permission needed
to visit the oil sites and talk to local authorities, farmers and herders in the oil-rich
areas, but Ugandan NGOs operating in the area also have great difficulties obtaining
research permits. Furthermore, there is a lot of frustration about the lack of
transparency about the so-called Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) that set the
agreement about the distribution of the resources extracted among public and private
actors.68 The Ugandan government has repeatedly refused to disclose information
about the PSA on the grounds that this would weaken its negotiation position vis-a`-
vis oil exploration companies in the future.69
The debate on the development of Uganda’s oil sector came to a head in October
2011, when Gerald Karuhanga, a western Uganda Youth MP, accused three
top ministers and close allies of Museveni of having accepted bribes from the
international oil company Tullow Oil.70 Karuhanga’s accusations have had far-
reaching political consequences. First, a majority in the Ugandan parliament, com-
posed of MPs across the political spectrum, has passed a resolution demanding that
a moratorium be placed on the execution of all oil contracts and transactions until
the putting in place of proper transparency and accountability laws. In addition to
this, it has also asked for an independent investigation into the oil bribery scandal.
During a party caucus at the end of October 2011, however, the NRM have decided
to overrule the parliamentary resolution, announcing the continuation of the oil
deals.71 Both the acceptance of the parliamentary resolution across party lines and
its subsequent overturning by the NRM have struck observers of Ugandan politics as
highly unusual and indicative of regime instability. While, on the one hand, it is clear
that many politicians, including members of the ruling party, want to have a greater
say about how Uganda’s oil resources should be managed, on the other hand, it is
also obvious that Museveni and his closest allies will not easily give up their firm
control over the oil sector. Second, Karahunga’s oil bribery allegations have laid bare
the existence of internal rivalries and power struggles within the NRM. The most
spectacular indication of this is that, in the beginning of January 2012, Museveni
informed the Central Executive Committee of the NRM of his decision to investigate
the possible involvement of Kahinda Otafiire in making fake oil bribery documents
and passing them on to Karahunga, presumably with the intention of attacking some
of his political rivals in the government,72 As already explained earlier on in this
article, Otafiire is a former member of the militarised shadow networks that
orchestrated the illegal exploitation of natural resources during the Congo war.
Although, in the past, he was considered a personal friend of Museveni,73 it now
seems as if he has fallen from grace and is no longer enjoying personal protection
from the President.
The opaque nature of Uganda’s oil sector makes it impossible to make strong
statements about the role played by former members of militarised shadow networks
such as Muhoozi Kainerugabe, Salim Saleh and Kahinda Otafiire. Nevertheless, it is
clear that, just like in the days of the Congo wars, the decisions concerning the
management of natural resource wealth are taken by a small group of strongmen
close to Museveni. Given the lax manner in which the Ugandan government has
dealt with the large amount of evidence concerning the involvement of members of
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the political and military elite in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the
DRC, it is not really surprising that, in the eyes of the political opposition, Uganda is
bound to fall victim to what is known as the ‘‘resource curse’’.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this paper illustrates that Uganda’s military involvement in
the Congolese wars was not only guided by greed and private ambitions of UPDF
commanders. Even if it has been argued that shadow networks under control of these
commanders have posed a considerable threat to regime and state stability in
Uganda, this article illustrates how activities of Ugandan military entrepreneurs and
those networks under their control became an integral part of Uganda’s governance
regime.
From this analysis, three further conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, borderlands
have played a crucial role in the development of military entrepreneurialism. The
historicisation of this largely informal transborder entrepreneurialism shows that the
networks on which it relies, have not been created ex nihilo. These networks do
represent much more than external parasitic structures, and are deeply embedded in
transaction and negotiation processes with local actors. These actors develop and
interact in a specific and pre-existing local and economic context of the borderland,
which limits, frames and sometimes mortgages their capacity of reproduction as
much as these very networks impact on the existing exchange structures. This case
study thus reveals that because they are providing ‘‘an institutional vacuum for the
unfolding of social processes’’,74 borderlands can be understood as regions of
inventiveness, having their own social dynamics and historical developments and
creating their own institutional arrangements and regulatory regimes. This illustrates
the highly informal character of economic and social exchanges in these areas that
often are beyond the reach of the central state.
Secondly, while during the Congolese conflict, these networks underwent a
process of transformation, they pre-existed the war and perpetuated after the war.
Neither do these networks necessarily provoke a further fragmentation of the
Ugandan state. Those controlling these networks have developed private interests
and (or even because) they are connected to the central state. These military shadow
networks could not flourish without links to the state machinery. The established
interactions, interlocking and straddling between shadow networks and the politi-
cal centre call into question the differentiated nature of the central state and the
‘‘so-called’’ private networks.
Finally, rather than including an often suggested ‘‘privatisation of the state’’,75
these processes are characterised by more indirect forms of political control, that
drive ‘‘the middle-ground between formal and informal, state and non-state spheres
of authority and regulation’’ at the margins of both the Ugandan and the Congolese
state.76 The threat of seeing a brutalisation of the military and the development of
autonomous ‘‘warlords’’ within the Ugandan state (as was suggested by Prunier,
Reno and others) never materialised. Rather, as demonstrated by our discussion of
recent developments in Uganda’s oil sector, the continuing straddling of public and
private functions helped these entrepreneurs of insecurity to face the transformation
of their environment once they left the DRC. By simultaneously keeping one foot in
the ‘‘bush and border’’77 and another in the state bureaucracy and national economy,
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they could thus both consolidate their private economic interests and serve the
political centre.
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